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1. Introduction 
Once again the UN climate process has been saved at the eighteenth Conference of the 
Parties (COP 18) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the ninth Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 8). In an unprecedented manoeuvre on Saturday evening, 
with the conference already a full day in overtime, COP President Al-Attiyah rush-
gavelled through the key decisions in 2 minutes and overruled Russia’s procedural 
objection. In the last days of the conference, many had already seen the talks close to 
collapse and were wondering whether a COP 18bis would need to be reconvened in 
2013, as had been the case after the collapse of COP 6 in The Hague in 2000. 
The last-minute drama was hardly corresponding to the agenda of the conference, which 
was little visionary. It included finalisation of the rules for the Kyoto Protocol’s second 
commitment period, finishing the negotiation track on enhanced action that was started 
in Bali in 2007, and agreeing a work programme for the new negotiation track that is to 
deliver a new comprehensive agreement by 2015. Doha was therefore from the 
beginning dubbed a “transitional” conference. 
However, climate change is apparently not waiting for the slow timetables of diplomats. 
The Doha meeting took place at the end of a year of increasingly stark warnings both on 
paper and delivered by mother nature herself. The US has suffered and is still suffering 
from a record drought, foreshadowing the permanent dust bowl the US Midwest is 
probably going to be turned into by climate change.1 Hurricane Sandy submerged vast 
swaths of the US East Coast including New York, prompting “Businessweek” to run its 
frontpage under the headline, “It’s Global Warming, Stupid”.2 In September, Arctic sea 
ice reached a new record low, 50% below the long-term average.3 The World Bank in a 
report published shortly before the conference warned of “cataclysmic consequences” if 
climate change was not reined in.4 And while the conference was ongoing, the 
Philippines were battered by “Bopha”, a typhoon of near-unprecedented strength that 
caused hundreds of deaths. 
“Bopha” prompted Naderev Saño, the lead negotiator of the Philippines, to make an 
passionate appeal to action to his fellow delegates, noting, “even as we vacillate and 
                                                
1 Romm, Joseph (2011): Desertification: The next dust bowl. In: Nature 478, pp. 450–451. 
2 It's Global Warming, Stupid – Businessweek, www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11-01/its-global-
warming-stupid, accessed 20 December 2012. 
3 BBC News - Record minimum for Arctic sea ice, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-
19652329, accessed 20 December 2012. 
4 New Report Examines Risks of 4 Degree Hotter World by End of Century, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/11/18/new-report-examines-risks-of-degree-hotter-world-by-
end-of-century, accessed 13 December 2012. 
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procrastinate here the death toll is rising. …If not us, then who? If not now, then when? 
If not here, then where?” 
However, overall the UN climate process continued plodding along its beaten path with 
hardly any sense of urgency on the side of the large emitters, reducing the countries that 
are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change to fight for bread crumbs. While 
some have tried to label the agreement of a second commitment period under the Kyoto 
Protocol as “historic”, the commitments of most countries are hardly better than 
business as usual. It speaks volumes that a provision to prevent countries from adopting 
emission targets that are higher than their current emissions was one of the issues that 
brought the conference to the brink of collapse. Industrialised countries also provided 
no clarity on the continuation of climate finance for developing countries, and the work 
programme for the negotiation of a new comprehensive climate agreement by 2015 and 
for revisiting the level of ambition for the period pre-2020 ended up being much less 
specific than many had hoped. 
This report lays out the main developments in Durban and assesses the main outcomes. 
The first chapter outlines the overall state of play coming into Doha. The subsequent 
chapters covers the negotiations on the future of the Kyoto Protocol, and the discussions 
under the Durban Platform on developing a new comprehensive climate agreement by 
2015 and increasing short-term ambition, and further near-term action under the 
UNFCCC.  
2. The General Picture Before Doha 
With the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol set to expire at the end of 2012 
(though not the Kyoto Protocol as a whole), the future framework of international 
climate policy had been very much in doubt up to the climate conference in Durban in 
2011. According to the Bali roadmap for a future climate agreement that was agreed at 
the Bali climate conference in 2007, negotiations for a future agreement have proceeded 
under two tracks. First, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments by Annex 
I Countries (= industrialised countries) under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), has been 
negotiating new targets for a second commitment period post-2012 as well as associated 
rules for accounting emissions. Second, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) has also been negotiating 
commitments for Annex I countries, intending to cover those that have not ratified the 
Protocol – that is, the USA. In addition, the LCA has negotiated on “Nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions” (NAMAs) of developing countries, which are to be 
supported by industrialised countries with technology, financing and capacity-building. 
Both the actions and the support are to be “measurable, reportable and verifiable”. The 
LCA has also negotiated how such support for developing countries’ mitigation actions 
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may be delivered as well as how developing countries may be supported in adapting to 
the impacts of climate change. 
Both tracks were to culminate in a new agreement at the Copenhagen climate 
conference in 2009. However, the conference nearly fell apart and only the 
controversial “Copenhagen Accord” emerged in the end, which was not even agreed to 
by all countries in the plenary.  
This fallout was mainly caused by fundamental differences of opinion on who should 
contribute how much to the fight against climate change and in particular who should 
go first. The so-called developing countries have pointed to the historical responsibility 
of the so-called developed countries for creating the climate problem and insist that 
Annex I countries should therefore take the lead in combating climate change, as they 
committed to in Art. 3.1 of the UNFCCC. The G-77 and China have therefore wanted 
the Kyoto Protocol to continue as a reflection of industrialised countries’ historical 
responsibility, in parallel to a separate outcome under the LCA. They have held a 
continuation of the Protocol to be a key prerequisite for maintaining the distinction 
between industrialised and developing countries. Creating a unified treaty would in their 
view blur this distinction and create a “slippery slope” where developing countries 
would soon also be asked to adopt binding emission targets. They have therefore aimed 
for two separate results from the two AWGs: On the one hand new post-2012 emission 
targets for Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol and on the other hand an 
agreement under the UNFCCC. The latter would cover commitments by the USA, 
mitigation actions by non-Annex I countries, adaptation, as well as financial and 
technological support from Annex I to non-Annex I countries. Developing countries 
also posited that no agreement would be possible under the AWG-LCA unless there 
was an agreement on a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Annex I countries for their part have pointed to the rising emissions in the large rapidly 
industrialising countries of the South and demanded that they needed to step up their 
efforts as well. Ideally, they wanted to have the Protocol replaced by a new universal 
framework that also covers the USA and the rapidly industrialising countries. In 
particular Canada, Japan and Russia have explicitly stated that they refused to be bound 
under a second Kyoto period. 
The USA for their part have demand a new structure that should be “very different” 
from the Kyoto Protocol. According to the USA, the future regime should be based on a 
“pledge and review” bottom-up approach. In this version, each country would basically 
determine its own level of ambition and the international system would mainly serve as 
a notary to collect and regularly review the implementation of these pledges. The USA 
have also insisted that the degree of bindingness must be the same for all the major 
emitters – a demand that has been vehemently rejected by developing countries.   
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After the failure in Copenhagen, the 2010 Cancún conference put the climate 
negotiations back on track, but with the end of 2012 approaching the question of the 
form of international climate policy loomed ever larger. Copenhagen and Cancún had 
only resulted in non-binding emission reduction pledges by countries – the model 
favoured by the USA. In the absence of further decisions this non-binding framework 
would by default have become the modus operandi of the climate regime. In addition, 
the pledges that have so far been made are far from ambitious enough to achieve the 
target of stabilising global temperature increase below 2°C compared to pre-industrial 
levels, as agreed as objective in Copenhagen. According to the latest edition of the 
annual “Emissions Gap Report” by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), this “gigatonne gap” between were global emissions need to go by 2020 and 
were they are actually going has in fact increased over the last year. It posits that annual 
global emissions should be reduced to at least 44 Gt CO2-eq. by 2020 to maintain a 
good chance of meeting the 2°C target. However, emissions were at about 50 Gt CO2-
eq. in 2010, they are projected to rise to about 58 Gt CO2-eq. by 2020 in a business-as-
usual scenario and even in the best-case scenario with full implementation of current 
pledges and strict accounting rules they would only be brought back to about 52 Gt 
CO2-eq. The figures for both the business-as-usual scenario and the best case scenario 
were 2 Gt CO2-eq. lower in last year’s report. The new report therefore now puts the 
gap at between 8 and 13 Gt CO2-eq., rather than 6 to 11 Gt CO2-eq. as in last year’s 
report.5 
In Durban, the EU therefore offered that it would be willing to be bound under a second 
Kyoto period if in return there was agreement on a new mandate to negotiate a new 
comprehensive and legally binding agreement that would include adequate 
contributions from all major emitters. This proposal was strongly resisted in particular 
by the USA, China and India, but the EU was able to form a coalition with the countries 
that are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, the Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDC), as well as several 
progressive Latin American countries. After much drama in the plenary and setting a 
new record for overtime, Parties finally agreed to establish a new “Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” (ADP). It was supposed to start 
work in 2012 and finish as early as possible but not later than 2015. However, the new 
agreement is supposed to come into effect and be implemented only from 2020. The 
decision therefore also stipulated that the ADP was also to discuss raising the level of 
ambition in the period up to 2020.  
In return, the EU agreed to continue the Kyoto Protocol, which many had already 
written off, in a second commitment period, but the details were still to be agreed at this 
year’s conference in Doha. The Durban conference also decided to terminate the AWG-
LCA at the Doha conference. However, many issues under the LCA had not yet been 
                                                
5 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Gap Widening as Nations Head to Crucial Climate Talks in Doha – UNEP, 
http://www.unep.org/newscentre/Default.aspx?DocumentID=2698&ArticleID=9335&l=en, accessed 17 
December 2012. 
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resolved to the satisfaction of developing countries, in particular on finance and 
technology. The decisions on these issues have in recent years followed a set course: 
while decisions on new institutions such as the Green Climate Fund have continued to 
be ever more well-defined, there has been a lack of clarity on how to fill these new 
institutions with reliable funding. In particular, in Copenhagen and Cancún developed 
countries had committed to scaling up climate finance to USD 100 billion annually by 
2020, starting with USD 30 billion over a “fast-start period” from 2010-2012. As the 
end of this period was approaching, non-Annex I countries demanded clarity on the way 
forward for the time after 2012. 
Going into Doha, the crunch issues were therefore expected to be the Kyoto Protocol’s 
second commitment period, post-2012 climate finance, the work programme for 
negotiating a new agreement until 2015 and ways to increase mitigation ambition in the 
period up to 2020. However, there were also plenty of other controversial issues in the 
building blocks of the Bali Action Plan, some of which, such as loss and damage, 
gained unexpected prominence in Doha. 
3. Agreement of the Second Commitment Period 
under the Kyoto Protocol 
As noted above, the Durban climate conference agreed in principle that there would be a 
second Kyoto period but left the details to be decided in Doha. There was a whole 
basket of political and technical issues that were still controversial. 
First, the voluntary emission reduction pledges that countries have made for 2020 
needed to be translated into quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments 
(QUERCs) for the entire commitment period. That is, Parties needed to decide how 
many assigned amount units (AAUs) will be issued to each industrialised country party 
that agrees to participate in the second commitment period. In addition, developing 
countries had long argued that the pledges put forward by industrialised countries were 
much too weak to achieve the 2°C target and should be significantly strengthened. 
However, industrialised countries in Doha again maintained that they were in no 
position to strengthen their commitments at this time, pointing to the lack of a 
comprehensive global agreement as a main reason. 
As expected, no further strengthening of the pledges took place in Doha. The new 
Article 3.1bis of the Kyoto Protocol puts the aggregate target of the countries that are 
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committing under CP2 at 18% below 1990 levels in the period 2013-20206, well below 
the range of 25-40% suggested by the IPCC. 
Furthermore, Parties needed to decide how long the second commitment period was 
going to be. Annex I countries had been in favour of having it run till 2020 in order to 
have it dovetail with the new comprehensive agreement that is to be negotiated by 2015 
and with the domestic legislation of many of them. By contrast, as developing countries 
considered that the targets were inadequate they had argued that this low level of 
ambition should not be locked in for too long. To address these concerns the EU had 
proposed making upgrading of the targets easier than it had so far been with the rules 
that had so far been applicable, which required adoption by a ¾ majority of all Parties. 
Developing countries had followed up with proposals according to which developed 
countries would have been obliged to increase their targets by 2013 or 2014. Developed 
countries objected both to the proposed dates as well as to the obligatory nature of the 
language proposed by developing countries. 
In the end, developing countries had to give in on the length of CP2, which is now 
going to be eight years, but with a review on the level of ambition in 2014. The decision 
stipulates that each Annex I Party "will revisit" (not "shall") its QUELRC "at the latest 
by 2014", with a reference to the 25-40% range suggested by the IPCC. Annex I Parties 
are requested to submit the information related to their intention to increase the target 
by 30 April 2014 and this information "shall be considered by Parties at a high level 
ministerial round table to be held during the first session period in 2014".7 However, 
some industrialised countries noted in the final plenary that this review process was not 
going to be helpful for increasing their ambition level; instead these discussions should 
be focused on in the ADP (see section 5). 
A legal problem that needed to be resolved was that to enter into force the decisions will 
need to be ratified by ¾ of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, which even in a best-case 
scenario can be expected to take at least two years. Developing countries therefore 
demanded that industrialised countries should provisionally apply the amendments to 
the Kyoto Protocol starting from 1 January 2013 pending formal ratification and entry 
into force. However, many industrialised countries argued that such a commitment to 
provisional implementation was incompatible with their constitutions. They therefore 
sought to reassure developing countries that they would nevertheless act consistently 
with the Kyoto amendments even before ratification. 
                                                
6 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol, Draft decision proposed by the President, Draft decision -/CMP.8, Amendment to 
the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, paragraph 9; Annex I, C, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9, 8 
December 2012. 
7 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol, Draft decision proposed by the President, Draft decision -/CMP.8, Amendment to 
the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, paragraph 9, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9, 8 December 2012, 
paras 7-10. 
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The final decision leaves two options to Parties. First, Parties "may provisionally apply" 
the amendment, that is, instead of making provisional application mandatory the text 
provides an op-in option. Second, the text states that Parties that do not apply the 
amendments provisionally "will implement their commitments and other 
responsibilities... in a manner consistent with their national legislation or domestic 
processes, as of 1 January 2013.8 
A further thorny issue was the carry-over of the surplus AAUs from the first to the 
second commitment period. Due to the economic restructuring in the former Eastern 
block countries in the 1990s, emissions in many of these countries are well below their 
targets for the first commitment period. For example, Russia has the target to stabilise 
emissions at 1990 levels but current emissions are about 30% lower. The total surplus 
has been estimated at about about 13 Gt CO2-eq. and therefore had the potential to 
substantially weaken the level of ambition of the second commitment period.9 The G-77 
and China as well as Switzerland proposed to limit the carry-over and use of surplus 
AAUs. The G77 and China proposal was to allow full carry-over but quarantine the 
AAUs in a “previous period surplus reserve” and restrict their use to domestic 
compliance for emissions going above the target in the second commitment period. 
Unused units were to be cancelled at the end of CP2. The Swiss proposal was very 
similar but instead of restricting the use of carried-over AAUs to emissions above the 
target would have stipulated a quantitative maximum at either 2.5% of the target or 
100/150 Mt CO2-eq. In addition, the G77 proposal would have capped the emission 
targets for the second commitment period at the level of 2012 emissions by providing 
that AAUs beyond that level would automatically be cancelled, while Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and the Ukraine had submitted emission targets above their current 
emissions. The potential new surplus from these emission growth targets had been 
estimated at another 3.6 Gt CO2-eq.10 
However, Russia and many other transition economies insisted on full carry-over in line 
with the original Kyoto rules, arguing that their surpluses were the result of their 
emission reduction efforts and therefore belonged to them as sovereign rights. The EU 
had been paralysed on this issue for years since old member states were in favour of 
limiting the carry-over while new member states and in particular Poland insisted on 
full carry-over. 
In the night from Thursday to Friday of the second week, the EU was finally able to 
agree to an internal compromise. Building on the proposals by the G-77 and 
Switzerland, the EU also proposed that for each Party a previous period surplus reserve 
                                                
8 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol, Draft decision proposed by the President, Draft decision -/CMP.8, Amendment to 
the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, paragraph 9, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9, 8 December 2012, 
paras 5f. 
9 Carry-Over of AAUs from CP1 to CP2 – Future Implications for the Climate Regime. A Briefing By 
PointCarbon. September 2012. 
10 ibid. 
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should be established consisting of the surplus AAUs. These AAUs were to be tradable, 
but buyers were to be restricted to purchasing only a certain percentage of their initial 
assigned amount of the first commitment period. Unlike the proposals by the G-77 and 
Switerzland, the proposal did not include cancellation of AAUs at the end of CP2. 
The final Presidency proposal and ultimate decision was largely based on the EU 
proposal, putting the limit for the acquisition of CP1 AAUs at 2% of the buyer’s 
countries initial CP1 assigned amount. In addition, Australia, the EU, Japan, 
Lichtenstein, Monaco, Norway and Switzerland attached political declarations in Annex 
II to the decision in which they stated that they were not going to purpose CP1 surplus 
AAUs. Moreover, the final decision includes addition of a new Article 3.7ter to the 
Kyoto Protocol to eliminate the possibility for new hot air in CP2. According to this 
proposal all CP2 AAUs above the average emissions level of the period 2008-2010 are 
to be cancelled. That is, countries’ targets are capped at their average emissions level in 
2008-2010.11 
According to news reports, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine may now decide not to 
participate in CP2 after all.12 
Another question was the eligibility to participate in the flexible Kyoto mechanisms, the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and international 
emissions trading. Canada had withdrawn its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2011 
and Japan, New Zealand and Russia had announced that they would not participate in a 
second commitment period. They nevertheless wanted to be able to use the Kyoto 
mechanisms for meeting the emission reduction pledges they have made under the 
Convention. In relation to the CDM this position was also supported by other 
industrialised countries, highlighting the vast oversupply on the carbon market, which 
has caused the price of CDM credits to fall below 1 Euro. They argued that the demand 
for credits should therefore be made as wide as possible to prop up the mechanism 
rather than being restricted. Japan has so far been the second largest buyer of CDM 
credits after the EU. But this position was strongly opposed by developing countries 
who argued that Kyoto was not a pick-and-choose menu, the benefits should only be 
available to those who also undertake commitments. 
The Presidency proposal resolved this issue by stipulating that countries not committing 
under CP2 can participate in CDM projects but they cannot transfer or acquire CDM 
credits or other Kyoto units.13 However, the CDM Executive Board this year decided 
                                                
11 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol, Draft decision proposed by the President, Draft decision -/CMP.8, Amendment to 
the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, paragraph 9, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9, 8 December 2012. 
12 Belarus negotiator hints at Kyoto exit, says others could follow | Reuters 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/12/10/us-climate-talks-kyoto-idUKBRE8B90ZY20121210, last 
accessed 10 December 2012. 
13 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol, Draft decision proposed by the President, Draft decision -/CMP.8, Amendment to 
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that project participants can request to have their CDM credits cancelled in the CDM 
registry. And government may therefore purchase and cancel CDM credits in the CDM 
registry and claim that this cancelation should be counted towards its pledge. In 
addition, the new reporting tables agreed for industrialised countries’ biannual update 
reports (see section 6.1.1) provide a column for recording the use of market-based 
mechanisms. While the table has a disclaimer that this reporting shall not prejudge the 
treatment of units towards the achievement of pledges, the technical infrastructure for 
doing so is therefore now in place. 
4. Towards the 2015 Agreement 
4.1 The Durban Platform 
The Durban Platform has two main issues: negotiating a new comprehensive climate 
agreement until 2015 that is to become applicable in 2020 and conducting a work 
programme for increasing mitigation ambition before 2020. The Bonn meeting in May 
agreed to address these issues in two separate work streams. This arrangement has the 
advantage that slow progress in one work stream will not automatically block progress 
in the other. The key task for Doha was to agree concrete work programmes for both 
work streams. The following covers the work stream on the 2015 agreement while the 
work stream on short-term ambition is covered in chapter 5. 
On negotiating a new agreement until 2015, the overarching controversy continues to be 
whether the so-called “firewall”, the clear distinction between on the one hand 
commitments for industrialised countries and on the other hand voluntary action by 
developing countries, should be maintained or modified. In particular the newly active 
“group of like-minded developing countries”, which consists of China and India, 
several Arab and left-leaning Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, Cuba and 
Venezuela, and further middle-income countries such as Malaysia, Pakistan and the 
Philippines, fears that the “firewall” may be abolished through the ADP. In Durban, one 
of the key controversies in the final hours had been whether the UNFCCC’s principles 
of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities should be explicitly referenced 
in the decision on the Durban Platform or not. In the end there had been no such 
reference due to strong resistance from the USA.  
In 2012, developing countries therefore continually emphasised that the ADP works 
under the Convention and that all of its principles apply. They noted that the mandate of 
the ADP should by no means be seen as being to negotiate a new regime or re-write the 
Convention. They also highlighted the need to focus not only mitigation but also on 
                                                                                                                                          
the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, paragraph 9, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9, 8 December 2012, 
paras 13-15. 
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adaptation and the so-called means of implementation, finance, technology and capacity 
building, noting that development and poverty eradication would continue to be the 
highest priorities for developing countries. Many developing countries also argued for 
starting a dedicated work programme on how equity would be operationalised in the 
2015 agreement. 
Annex I countries also all affirmed that the Convention’s principles apply, the question 
was not if but how to apply them. They also agreed that universality of application 
would not mean uniformity of content. The EU argued for defining a spectrum of 
commitments, with different levels of effort for different groups of Parties. The USA 
emphasised that while the bindingness of the new agreement and the reporting 
provisions should be the same for all, the contents of countries’ commitments could be 
differentiated. They re-iterated their argument for a bottom-up approach to 
commitments to make sure that no country would be asked to do more than it was 
willing and able to. Also many developing countries including China and other 
emerging economies agreed that the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities should not be used as an excuse for inaction and to avoid commitments. 
Nevertheless, when it came to the wording to be agreed on, the differences between 
countries came back to the fore. For instance, China suggested to consider 
“commitments and/or actions”, whereas the USA objected that “actions” was a “term of 
art” that was meant to obfuscate meaning whereas “commitments” was a term whose 
meaning was clear to all while at the same time leaving substantial flexibility in the 
context of the Convention. The USA also again objected to referencing the principles of 
the Convention, due to concern that they may be invoked to uphold the “firewall” 
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries.  
As in Durban, the final decision does not mention these principles and even a reference 
to the outcome of the Rio+20 conference, which did endorse them, was deleted at the 
insistence of the USA. What is left is language that the ADP’s work will be guided by 
the principles of the Convention, and in the final plenary the USA noted that in their 
view this provision had no relation to mandate of the ADP and that they would reject 
any attempt to invoke it in the ADP’s further work. 
The work programme that was ultimately agreed is not very specific. Elements for a 
negotiation text are to be in place at COP20 in 2014, and a draft negotiation text is to be 
on the table before May 2015. The text also notes that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon will convene a world leaders’ summit on climate change in 2014.14 
Countries agreed to have additional sessions in spring and/or in autumn, subject to the 
availability of financial resources. Countries and observes are invited to submit their 
views and proposals on issues such as the application of the principles of the 
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FCCC/CP/2012/L.13, 8 December 2012. 
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Convention in the new agreement, which gives space for the further consideration of 
equity; building on the experiences and lessons learned from other processes under the 
UNFCCC and from other multilateral processes; the scope, structure and design of the 
2015 agreement; and ways of defining and reflecting “enhanced action”.15 
4.2 Shared Vision 
Also relating to the long-term though placed under the AWG-LCA, the first item in the 
Bali Action Plan was to develop a “shared vision for long-term cooperative action, 
including a long-term global goal for emission reductions”.16 According to the most 
ambitious scenario considered in the IPCC’s fourth assessment report, to have a 50% 
chance of achieving the 2°C target global emissions should peak well before 2020 and 
be reduced by 50-85% by 2050 compared to 2000. The EU, AOSIS as well as other 
developing countries had long demanded to adopt these figures within the UNFCCC.  
Many of the large emerging economies and other developing countries, however, had 
argued that these numbers could not be considered in isolation. In their view there first 
of all needed to be clarity on what the implications of these goals would be for the 
economies of developing countries and how the effort to achieve these goals would be 
shared among countries in an equitable manner.  
Given that agreement was visibly not within reach, the discussions in Doha revolved 
around defining a process to explore the “numbers” as well as their implications. In 
addition, the decision in Durban had put global peaking into the context of equitable 
access to sustainable development (EASD) and the May session in Bonn had included a 
workshop on this concept. In Doha, developing demanded to start a process to consider 
how to implement EASD. 
In the end, it was not possible to agree to any kind of work plan. The COP merely 
decided to “urgently work towards the deep reduction in global greenhouse gas 
emissions required … and to attain a global peaking of global greenhouse gas emissions 
as soon as possible, consistent with science and as documented in the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, reaffirming that 
the time frame for peaking will be longer in developing countries” It also decided that 
“Parties’ efforts should be undertaken on the basis of equity and common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and the provision of finance, 
technology transfer and capacity-building to developing countries in order to support 
their mitigation and adaptation actions under the Convention, and take into account the 
                                                
15 Planning of work, Draft conclusions proposed by the Co-Chairs, Advance unedited version. 
16 Decision 1/CP13, Bali Action Plan, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 2008, para 1(a) 
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imperatives of equitable access to sustainable development, the survival of countries 
and protecting the integrity of Mother Earth”.17 
Even this text was too strong for the USA, who during the closing plenary noted that it 
accepted this text only “to the extent that it is not read in a matter that is inconsistent 
with the Convention or the Cancun agreements”, and asked to reflect its reservation in 
the meeting’s report. 
4.3 Review of the Global Temperature Goal 
Another LCA item with bearing on the 2015 agreement was the review of the 
temperature target of keeping global warming below 2°C that was agreed in 
Copenhagen and Cancún, with a view to strengthening it to 1.5°C as demanded by 
AOSIS and the LDCs, and the progress towards achieving the target. This review is to 
take place in 2013-2015 and will hence feed into the work of the ADP. It will also 
coincide with the next IPCC assessment report. Parties still needed to agree on the 
detailed terms of reference for the Review. 
In particular AOSIS, supported by the EU, had previously demanded that the scope of 
the review should be restricted to the adequacy of the temperature goal and progress 
towards achieving it, as agreed in Cancún. However, other developing countries, in 
particular India, had demanded to widen the scope of the review to also include the 
support provided by industrialised to developing countries, often also referred to as 
“means of implementation”.  
In Doha, AOSIS also put forward a detailed proposal for how to conduct the review. In 
their view the COP’s subsidiary bodies – the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SB) 
and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) – were not 
appropriate to conduct the review as they lacked the required scientific expertise. They 
therefore suggested to establish a review expert group (REG) to do most of the work, 
which was to report to COP 19 and 20 and deliver a synthesis report to the first session 
of the ADP in 2015. 
Other Parties noted that they were not convinced of the need for creating a separate 
group and were partly also opposed to giving such a strong mandate to the REG, with 
e.g. China noting that under the proposal the REG “could do anything they want”. 
Countries ultimately agreed that the review should periodically assess the adequacy of 
the long-term global goal as well as overall progress made towards achieving this goal, 
“including a consideration of the implementation of the commitments under the 
                                                
17 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention, Revised proposal by the President, Draft decision -/CP.18, Agreed outcome pursuant to 
the Bali Action Plan, FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, 8 December 2012, paras 1f. 
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Convention”. While not made explicit, this covers industrialised countries’ 
commitments relating to finance, technology and capacity building. Contrary to AOSIS’ 
wishes, the process will be driven by the two subsidiary bodies, which are to establish a 
joint contact group to assist the COP in conducting the review. In concession to AOSIS’ 
request regarding input from experts, the COP resolved “to engage in a structured 
expert dialogue that aims to support the work of the joint contact group (…), to ensure 
the scientific integrity of the review”. The dialogue is to be conducted “through regular 
scientific workshops and expert meetings and with the participation of Parties and 
experts”, in particular from the IPCC. The dialogue will be facilitated by two co-
facilitators from industrialised and developing countries, who will report to COP 19 and 
20.18 
5. The Durban Platform Work Stream on Short-
Term Ambition 
On short-term ambition, the EU and others reiterated their suggestions from the 
previous sessions to focus on initiatives that are complementary to the current national 
pledges, such as regulating emissions from international aviation and shipping that have 
so far not been regulated internationally, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, and 
cooperative actions on deforestation, renewable energy, energy efficiency or short-lived 
climate forcers such as soot. The EU suggested that the UNFCCC should send a clear 
political signal on the importance of complementary initiatives to the relevant bodies, 
such as the Montreal Protocol, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) 
and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). In addition, in their view the 
UNFCCC could recognise such initiatives, provide transparency on what they mean in 
terms of closing gap, and highlight best practice. For the work plan the EU suggested to 
have an annual Secretariat synthesis paper, in particular on complementary initiatives 
and to what extent they contribute to achieving the 2°C target. They also suggested to 
conduct dedicated discussions on particular themes from early 2013. 
In particular countries from the Umbrella Group, such as Japan, New Zealand and the 
USA, claimed that a “huge amount of actions” was already underway, including at the 
regional and city level. In their view it would be useful to record and recognise these 
actions and explore ways for incentivising further actions by cities and private sector 
organisations. 
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Developing countries universally highlighted that increasing their own level of ambition 
would depend on the provision of means of implementation by developed countries. 
They urged industrialised countries to take the lead in reducing emissions as stipulated 
in the Convention and increase their emission targets as well as their provision of 
finance, technology and capacity building to enable further mitigation actions by 
developing countries. In this respect they noted that the basis for increasing ambition 
was going to be laid in the AWG-KP and in the AWG-LCA, by strong CP2 
commitments and strong LCA results on finance, technology and capacity building.  
Developing countries also stressed that complementary initiatives could be useful but 
not be a substitute for strengthening emission targets and means of implementation. The 
Marshall Islands noted that according to UNEP’s “gap” report increased national low-
carbon policies had the potential to deliver 22 Gt CO2-eq. or more by 2020 while 
complementary international initiatives could deliver only up to 5 Gt CO2-eq.. AOSIS 
therefore proposed a detailed work programme consisting of a series of workshops in 
2013. These workshops were to discuss the available mitigation potential sector by 
sector and were to involve all relevant ministries. The Secretariat was to prepare theme-
specific technical papers highlighting the available mitigation potential. In addition, 
there were to be high-level ministerial meetings and a summit on pre-2020 mitigation 
ambition at COP20.  
Other countries including Annex I and non-Annex I countries urged to leave the work 
plan more vague in order to maintain flexibility. They argued that a very specific work 
plan might lead to very formalised discussions and thus not be a very effective exercise. 
As so far only about 80 countries had made emission reduction pledges, many also 
highlighted the need for further countries to step in. Many in particular expected that 
having the COP would prompt the host country Qatar and maybe also other rich Gulf 
monarchies to put numbers on the table. However, Qatar, together with Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, was only moved to indicate its readiness to put 
forward “actions and plans in pursuit of economic diversification that have co-benefits 
in the form of emission reductions, adaptation to the impacts of climate change and 
response measures.”19 What exactly these are going to be remains to be seen. 
The work plan that was ultimately agreed is much weaker than requested by AOSIS and 
others. Parties and observers are invited to submit their views and proposals on issues 
such as mitigation and adaptation benefits, barriers and ways to overcome them, and 
incentives for actions, and finance, technology, and capacity-building to support 
implementation. The ADP decided to hold roundtable discussions and workshops, but 
their content was not determined in advance. Instead, the ADP Co-Chairs are to set out 
focused questions for these discussions in early 2013, taking into account the 
submissions. The secretariat is to prepare a technical paper “compiling information on 
                                                
19 Proposal by the President, Draft decision -/CP.18, Draft decision on economic diversification initiative, 
FCCC/CP/2012/L.11, 7 December 2012. 
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the mitigation benefits of the actions, initiatives and options to enhance mitigation 
ambition identified in the submissions”. The first version of the technical paper is to be 
made available before the session in June 2013.20 
6. Closing the AWG-LCA and Further 
Operationalising the Cancún Agreements 
In addition to finishing the negotiations on the second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol the Doha conference also had the task to terminate the work under the Bali 
Action Plan that has in the past five years been carried out in the AWG-LCA on the 
main building blocks mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology. The previous 
conferences in Cancún and Durban had already concluded the political discussions on 
some issues and mandated the subsidiary bodies to carry out further technical work, 
which is also covered in the following. 
6.1 Mitigation 
6.1.1 Annex I Mitigation 
As described in section 2 of this report, there is a fundamental gap between pledged 
emission reductions and what would be needed to stay within a 2° limit. Consequently, 
in the negotiations, developing countries urged developed countries to increase ambition 
and to reconsider their pledges or move to the higher end of their pledges.  
Beyond this fundamental mismatch, another problem with the pledges is the difficulty 
to assess them due to conditionalities and the lack of common accounting standards. No 
significant progress was made on this issue in Doha. In the negotiations the need to 
present pledges as a single number referring to one common base year (1990) was 
stressed by many countries. So far, pledges relate to different bases years, for example 
the USA has pledged to reduce emissions by 17% compared to 2005 levels, which 
translates to 3-4% below 1990 levels. In addition, many countries again demanded that 
developed countries without commitments under the Kyoto Protocol should at least 
agree to common accounting rules. They noted that common accounting was crucial for 
the comparability of efforts, one of the key objectives of the Bali Action Plan. 
However, the USA again rejected all attempts to move towards common accounting. 
Finally, it was only decided to continue negotiations and establish a work programme 
(after the closure of the AWG-LCA) within SBSTA in 2013 to clarify the emission 
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reduction targets: “with a view to: (a) identifying common elements for measuring the 
progress made towards the achievement of the quantified economy-wide emission 
reduction targets; and (b) Ensuring the comparability of efforts among developed 
country Parties taking into account differences in their national circumstances”21 
Parties were asked to submit views on the work programme by 25 March 2013. The 
secretariat was requested to annually update a technical paper on the progress of 
clarifying the targets. 
More positively, it was one of the successes of the Doha negotiations that common 
tabular formats for the biennial reporting for developed countries were adopted in the 
SBI.22 The tables contain sections on historic emissions (by sector and by year) as well 
as sections on different scenarios of future emission developments.  
6.1.2 Non-Annex I Mitigation 
In the Bali Action Plan in 2007, nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) 
were introduced as a key mechanism to increase mitigation ambition in developing 
countries. Two cornerstones of the concept of NAMAs are that they should be 
supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building and that these 
activities should be measurable, reportable and verifiable. In Cancun it was decided to 
“set up a registry to record nationally appropriate mitigation actions seeking 
international support and to facilitate matching of finance, technology and capacity-
building support for these actions”.23 Given that there is very little definition at 
UNFCCC level of what actually a NAMA is, the registry underpins the learning by 
doing process we are currently seeing in NAMA development: developing countries can 
take ownership and define which actions they propose as NAMAs for recognition and 
for which actions they seek additional funding. 
The negotiations on the registry for NAMAs in some way mirror the general situation of 
NAMAs altogether: Developing countries have started filling the existing registry 
prototype with proposals for NAMAs – however, to date, not a single funding offer has 
been given to the UNFCCC for registration. This corresponds with the overall situation 
of NAMAs: many developing countries are active in developing NAMA proposals24 
(for which they indeed have been receiving support) but very little funding for NAMA 
implementation has been put on the table. Only at the end of the negotiations Germany 
and UK announced the launch of a NAMA facility with a funding of approx. 70 million 
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22 Draft decision -/CP.18,Common tabular format for “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed 
country Parties” (Advanced unedited version). 
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Euro25 - a promising first step, which helps to actually start implementing NAMAs. But 
obviously only a tiny step towards meeting the high ambitions of international support 
promised at Copenhagen (see section 6.3 on climate finance). As a consequence, 
developing countries Parties repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction with the general 
climate finance situation in the discussions on the NAMA registry in Doha. 
The UNFCCC secretariat presented the status quo on the NAMA registry: proposals for 
the structure of the future web-based solution, including hierarchies and access right 
regulations for parties and funding institutions who wish to provide information through 
the registry.26 A fully functional version of the dynamic web-based registry is supposed 
to be presented two months before COP 19.27 
It is important to note that the registry is planned to be set-up with no mandatory fields. 
Thus Parties may freely choose which of the information asked for in the template they 
wish to provide. It was highlighted in the discussions that obviously, more detailed and 
formalised information would facilitate a matching of funding with NAMA proposals – 
and it may thus be in the interest of developing countries seeking funding, to provide 
this information. However, this rather technical detail underpins that beyond the match 
making option, the registry may well serve to increase transparency on the wide variety 
of mitigation actions of developing countries (record NAMAs) – but it is obviously not 
the intention to make the registry a tool for stringent MRV of mitigation actions. 
MRVing of the outputs of NAMAs will most likely occur in national communications 
(and biennial update reports) and possibly even more stringently upon request of 
institutions supporting NAMAs.  
Regarding MRV, one issue often raised by developing countries is that of costs and 
capacity needed to provide the requested information. On this background, MRV 
requirements have been less strict for developing countries. However, in Cancún Parties 
had agreed on enhancing both Annex I and non-Annex I MRV. Developing countries 
are to submit national communications every four years and provide biennial update 
reports with updates on their national GHG inventories, information on mitigation 
actions, needs and support received. The reports are to be discussed in a process of 
“international consultation and analysis (ICA)”. 
In the SBI conclusions on Provision of financial and technical support28 a somewhat 
contradictory picture emerges. On the one hand non-Annex I parties express “concerns 
over the availability of sufficient financial and technical support for the preparation of 
                                                
25 BMU - English - Current Press Releases - Press Release No 160/16 as of 06.12.2012: Germany and the 
United Kingdom launch NAMA Facility in Doha, 
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biennial update reports (BURs)” on the other hand, the SBI “noted with concern that as 
of 1 October 2012 the GEF secretariat had only received four requests for support to 
prepare BURs.” Consequently, non-Annex I countries were urged to submit requests for 
support to the GEF. 
6.1.3 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
Emissions from deforestation and forest degradation account for nearly 20% of all 
global greenhouse gas emissions. However, it was only at COP 11 in Montreal in 2005 
that addressing forests was taken up under the Convention and in 2007 the issue was 
included as one of the mitigation sub-items in the Bali Action Plan. 
In the run-up to the negotiations in Doha, expectations were high that COP18 could lead 
to significant progress in the efforts towards establishing an international mechanism 
for providing incentives to developing countries for reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation and enhancing their forest-related carbon stocks 
(REDD+). Part of these expectations were linked to the advances REDD+ had made in 
the past, both inside and outside the UNFCCC negotiations. At the national level, 
developing countries are taking important steps in getting ready for REDD+, such as 
Mexico, which has just passed legislative reforms to embed REDD+ into its national 
legal frameworks. At the same time, significant achievements had been made in the 
negotiations process itself since 2005.   
One major step was made with the Cancún Agreements in 2010, when Parties agreed on 
the “phased” approach to REDD+, which allows developing countries to first develop 
their policy frameworks and capacities, followed by the implementation of 
demonstration activities, before finally moving into the implementation of results-based 
actions that are fully measured, reported and verified (MRVed). Social and 
environmental safeguards were also established in Cancún and REDD+ countries were 
requested to inter alia develop national strategies or action plans, establish national 
forest reference (emissions) levels and information systems on safeguards (SIS). In 
order to provide assistance to countries in undertaking these steps, COP16 mandated  
SBSTA to develop the respective methodological guidance under the REDD+ work 
programme in addition to the identification of drivers of deforestation. One year later, in 
Durban, Parties reached agreement on how to operationalise safeguards and some 
progress was also achieved with regard to SIS and national reference (emissions) levels. 
However, no common ground was found on modalities for national forest monitoring 
systems (NFMS) and MRV, and the work programme was extended to further consider 
these issues until the end of 2012.  
In addition to negotiations on these technical aspects under the SBSTA, the 
controversial question of financing was considered under the AWG-LCA. After no 
agreement on financing options had been reached in Durban last year, Parties and 
observers had been invited to submit inputs on modalities and procedures for financing 
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of results-based action. These submissions had been considered by the AWG-LCA 
during 2012 and resulted in a technical paper for further consideration in Doha. 
Hence, the major fora of REDD+ negotiations in Doha were the SBSTA and the AWG-
LCA, with the treatment of technical issues under the SBSTA being the main track in 
the first week of negotiations. After the opening session of the REDD+ SBSTA contact 
group Parties shifted directly into the informal negotiations mode and meetings were 
held behind closed doors until Saturday to discuss methodological guidance for NFMS 
and MRV. Initially, substantial progress was achieved: national forest monitoring 
systems were agreed to be linked to safeguard information systems and a link between 
the setting of reference levels and MRV methods was established, ensuring that 
consistent and similar methods need to be used in all countries. However, negotiations 
stalled when Parties touched on the issue of verification and a major divide between 
donor countries and developing countries emerged. While Norway, currently the biggest 
investor in activities to reduce deforestation, was pushing for independent verification 
of actions by international experts, Brazil was opposed to external verification, arguing 
that MRV of REDD+ should be consistent with the process of international consultation 
and analysis (ICA) that was agreed for NAMAs and which is considerably softer on 
developing countries. With Parties unable to resolve this issue in Doha and an 
agreement on verification out of reach, the final text on NFMS and MRV remained 
bracketed and Parties decided to continue the work during 2013 with a draft decision to 
be prepared by COP19 in Warsaw.29 
In parallel to the SBSTA process, policy approaches and positive incentives for REDD+ 
were considered under the AWG-LCA. After Parties had agreed on the development of 
a new text as a basis for the negotiations in Doha, the negotiation process on so-called 
results-based finance was dominated by different views on incentives for non-carbon 
benefits and institutional arrangements.  
Financing has for a long time been the largest sticking point of the REDD+ 
negotiations, and Parties continue to have differing perspectives on how results-based 
actions should be financed. While some industrialised countries, such as Australia, USA 
and Japan, want the emission reductions resulting from REDD+ actions to be converted 
into tradable emission reductions that Annex I Parties can account against their 
emission reduction targets, Brazil and other developing countries have opposed the 
creation of a new offset mechanism for REDD+. Bolivia, in particular, opposes any 
market-based approach arguing in favour of a fully different structure for REDD+. In 
the light of these differing views, Parties in Doha agreed to undertake a work 
programme on results-based finance in 2013, which will be chaired by two co-chairs, 
one from a developing and one from a developed country Party. The overall aim of the 
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work programme is to contribute to the ongoing efforts to scale up and improve the 
effectiveness of finance for REDD+ activities by taking into account market-based and 
non-market based approaches and by exploring different options, including ways to 
incentivise non-carbon benefits. The work programme envisages two in-session 
workshops that are to result in a report for consideration by the COP with a view to the 
adoption of a decision on results-based payments at COP19 in Warsaw.30  
The issue of incentivising benefits beyond carbon made its way into the final text after 
Parties had exchanged very divergent views on this topic: While LDCs advocated such 
an approach and suggested requesting SBSTA to explore options for performance-based 
payments for non-carbon benefits, several developed countries such as Norway and 
Australia stated that results-based payments should be made for carbon only. In the end, 
Parties did not only agree to address non-carbon benefits within the newly established 
work programme but further requested SBSTA to initiate work on methodological 
issues related to non-carbon benefits resulting from REDD+ activities. SBSTA was also 
requested to consider how non-market-based approaches, such as joint mitigation and 
adaptation approaches, could be developed, an issue of particular importance to Bolivia. 
The body is to report on both matters at COP 19.31  
In the light of the expected end of the AWG-LCA at COP18, finding an “institutional 
home for REDD+” was another issue that dominated the REDD+ negotiations in Doha. 
The idea of establishing a REDD+ Committee, brought up by Papua New Guinea on 
behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, proved particularly contentious. The 
proposed REDD+ Committee would be responsible for future discussions on the 
mechanism and also coordinate financial and technical support for REDD+ countries. 
While this idea was supported by a large number of developing countries, most 
developed countries rejected the creation of new institutions in Doha and maintained 
that functions of such an institution should be identified first. The final text from Doha 
reflects these different views by requesting SBI and SBSTA to jointly consider existing 
institutional arrangements or potential governance alternatives such as a body, a board 
or a committee. SBI and SBSTA were further requested to address the need to improve 
the coordination of support for REDD+ activities and the need to provide adequate and 
predictable support for REDD+ countries, including financial resources and technical 
and technological support. The COP invited Parties and observers to submit their views 
on these issues to the secretariat by 25 March 2013 and requested the secretariat to 
organise an in-session workshop at the next SBSTA/SBI meeting, where the 
submissions should be taken into account. Following these activities, the subsidiary 
bodies will make recommendations to COP19.32 
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The Doha outcome on REDD+ has led to some disillusion among observers. After years 
of advancing at high speed, the REDD+ negotiations in Doha did not deliver substantial 
results and key questions remain unanswered. Negotiations on REDD+ seem to have 
entered a new stage or, as Tony La Viña, REDD+ negotiator for the Philippines put it: 
“The truth is that the honeymoon is over for REDD+, we are down now to the nuts and 
bolts of the mechanism”33.  
6.1.4 New Market Mechanisms 
Many industrialised countries maintain that mechanisms putting a price on carbon and 
allowing for international trading of emissions credits are the most cost effective way to 
reduce GHG emissions globally. Against this background, several Parties are promoting 
the introduction of new market mechanisms in the UNFCCC context, which are to 
cover broad segments of the economy and should thereby leverage significantly higher 
emission reductions than the current Kyoto mechanims CDM and JI. 
Views on this matter have been exchanged for some time now under the heading 
“Various approaches, including opportunities for using markets, to enhance the cost-
effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions“ as part of the AWG-LCA 
negotiations. Parties’ views on this matter differ mainly on what the role of the 
UNFCCC should have in this context. Therefore, two separate streams have evolved in 
the discussions:   
• New Market Mechanism (NMM) 
• Framework for Various Approaches (FVA),  
which may include market and non-market mechanisms 
The EU and others promote a top-down view with regulations for a new market 
mechanism defined at and supervised at the UNFCCC level (in analogy to the CDM). In 
its submissions, the EU proposes a voluntary sectoral crediting and a more stringent 
sectoral trading mechanism, which can be seen as an intermediary step towards a 
comprehensive cap and trade system.34 
By contrast, other Parties prefer a lose framework for market approaches, which could 
include national offsetting schemes like the Japanese Bilateral Offset Crediting 
Mechanism (BOCM) with nationally defined (and less stringent) accounting rules. With 
the exception of Norway, this view has in the meantime been adopted by the entire 
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Umbrella Group (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, 
USA).   
At last year’s climate change conference in Durban, Parties reached an agreement to 
establish a New Market Mechanism in principle, operating under the guidance and 
authority of the COP, which “may assist developed countries to meet part of their 
mitigation targets or commitments under the Convention”.35 The AWG-LCA was asked 
to develop modalities and procedures for this mechanism, to be considered by this 
year’s Conference of the Parties. In addition, the AWG-LCA was asked to conduct a 
work programme to consider whether to establish a framework for various approaches. 
Yet there has been little progress since the Durban COP. The major discussion points in 
Doha therefore were the role the UNFCCC should have in a Framework for Various 
Approaches. The Umbrella Group (minus Norway) reiterated their wish for a rather 
weak role, consisting of exchange of information, experience and good practice on 
standards. This view was opposed by the EU and developing countries, who reiterated 
their position that the FVA was not about facilitation but about the COP acting as 
regulator to determine and enforce common standards. Bolivia and the ALBA countries 
stressed once again their desire to incorporate non-market mechanisms under the FVA. 
As regards the NMM, the EU was rather isolated in its desire to achieve quick 
implementation. In addition, many see the NMM as being under the umbrella of the 
FVA whereas the EU sees the NMM as separate from the NMM, which further 
complicated discussions.   
In the end, Parties failed to reach agreement on further specifying what the framework 
should look like or which design features the NMM should be composed of. Rather, a 
work programme was set up to continue discussions on the purpose, scope, procedures 
to ensure environmental integrity and institutions of the various approaches. On the 
NMM, Parties “agreed to consider” a long list of elements, which would make the 
NMM a top-down, UNFCCC driven mechanism with common accounting, including: 
• “Standards that deliver real, permanent, additional, and verified mitigation 
outcomes, avoid double counting of effort and achieve a net decrease and/or 
avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions;”  
• “Requirements for the accurate measurement, reporting and verification of 
emission reductions, emission removals and/or avoided emissions;36” 
At the same time, the decision on the framework for various approaches does not refer 
to either standards or MRV. Yet the decision states that “any such framework will work 
                                                
35 Decision 2/CP.17, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention, para 79. 
36 Draft Decision -/CP.18, Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan (Advance unedited version), 
paras 44-56 
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under the authority and guidance of the Conference of Parties”. It was furthermore 
decided that the work programme shall address: 
• “Procedures to ensure environmental integrity (…)”and 
• “Technical specifications to avoid double counting through the accurate and 
consistent recording and tracking of mitigation outcomes”37 
Given that the text on the FVA re-emphasizes that “all such approaches must meet 
standards that deliver real, permanent, additional and verified mitigation outcomes, 
avoid double counting of effort and achieve a net decrease and/or avoidance of 
greenhouse gas emissions” some sort of convergence of the FVA and the NMM tracks 
may be possible in the future. Parties are invited to submit views on both issues to the 
secretariat by 25 March 2013. 
6.2 Adaptation 
Negotiations in Doha where held against the backdrop of a year with extreme weather 
events in both developing and developed countries. While hurricane Sandy had caused 
damage of more than 50 billion USD by devastating large parts of the US east coast in 
late October, the Philippines where hit by a cyclone during the second week of the 
climate negotiations killing hundreds of people and making thousands homeless. 
Together with new reports38 indicating that the world is currently heading towards a 
scenario where such weather extremes would represent the order of the day the 
negotiations on adaptation in Doha attracted considerable attention.  
These negotiations built on significant progress achieved over the last years: In Durban, 
the Adaptation Committee, which had been established one year before in Cancún, was 
made operational and Parties agreed on its composition, modalities and procedures. 
Furthermore, initial guidelines to assist Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the 
formulation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) had been established. Regarding the 
question on how to deal with those adverse effects of climate change that cannot be 
addressed through adaptation measures, Durban saw the renewal of the Work 
Programme on Loss and Damage.  
After having held its first meeting in September 2012, the Adaptation Committee in 
Doha presented its first report as well as a draft three-year work plan, which was 
approved by the COP. The work plan, which Parties generally regarded as very 
ambitious, comprises a broad range of activities to promote coherence in adaptation 
under the Convention as well as to enhance synergies with organisations, regional 
centres and network outside the UNFCCC. It envisages meetings and workshops to 
                                                
37 Ibid 
38 See, for instance: World Bank (2012): Turn down the heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided. 
http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_centrigr
ade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf , accessed 19 December 2012.   
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identify areas of duplication, gaps and synergies and foster the exchange between 
institutions. The work plan further comprises the collection and compilation of 
information on ongoing adaptation actions and support provided by institutions in order 
to increase knowledge and provide technical support and guidance to the Parties.39 In its 
final decision, the COP further requests the Adaptation Committee to consider the 
establishment of an annual adaptation forum, with the aim to raise awareness on 
adaptation actions and to enhance coherence of actions.40       
Another important step was made with the development of technical guidelines for the 
formulation and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) in LDCs. These 
guidelines had been prepared by the Least Developed Countries Expert Group on the 
basis of the initial guidelines agreed at COP 17. In Doha, the SBI welcomed the 
technical guidelines for the NAP process and looked forward to their application, as 
appropriate. The technical guidelines will support LDCs in initiating a continuous, 
iterative and progressive planning process for identifying medium and long-term 
adaptation needs and develop the respective strategies and programmes. Doha also 
resulted in guidance on support for NAPs for LDCs. In its final text, the COP agreed on 
guidance to the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which is administering the Least 
Developed Countries Fund, requesting the entity to provide funding to meet the agreed 
full cost of preparing the NAPs. Funding should be provided following a flexible 
approach that enables access of LDCs and maintains support for addressing immediate 
adaptation needs through the development of NAPAs (national adaptation programmes 
of action). Regarding the development of NAPs in non-LDCs, the COP encourages the 
Adaptation Committee to continue developing the respective modalities, a task which is 
reflected in the AC’s work plan with the creation of an ad hoc working group. The COP 
further urges developed countries to mobilise financial support for the NAPs process in 
non-LDCs.41   
The dominating issue of the negotiations, however, was the question on how to deal 
with climate-related loss and damage that cannot be addressed through adaptation 
measures, such as weather extremes and slow onset events, including, inter alia, sea 
level rise and increasing temperatures. Positions of developed and developing countries 
differed substantially and the question whether an international mechanism for 
addressing loss and damage should be installed proved particularly controversial: While 
the USA and other industrialised countries opposed the installation of such a 
mechanism, fearing future claims for compensation of climate-related losses, 
G77/China, AOSIS, the African Group and the LDC group wanted such a mechanism to 
be established in Doha, making clear that dropping the topic was not an option. After 
the controversy could not be resolved under the SBI the issue was forwarded to the 
ministerial level and became one main crunch issue of the final marathon all-night 
                                                
39 Report of the Adaptation Committee, FCCC/SB/2012/3, 16 November 2012.  
40 Draft decision -/CP.18: Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan (Advance unedited version), 
para 57.  
41 Draft decision -/CP.18: National adaptation plans (Advance unedited version)   
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session. In the end, a compromise was found with the agreement to establish 
“institutional arrangements, such as an international mechanism” at COP19 in Warsaw, 
a compromise formula tabled by the Qatari COP President to be taken as part of the 
entire final package of decisions.42  
Remarkably, the final text does not mention the term “compensation” that was included 
in a previous text version and which many developing countries, in particular LDCs and 
AOSIS countries, wanted to see reflected in the final decision. However, the US had 
strongly opposed any terms that could connote legal liability, therefore reference is only 
made to approaches to rehabilitate from climate-related loss and damage. 
The question on where the issue of loss and damage should be discussed beyond Doha 
was also not free of controversy. While developing countries favoured a continuation of 
the work programme the US preferred the issue to be treated under the Adaptation 
Committee and Nairobi Work Programme. Despite the United States arguing that the 
work programme on loss and damage was to complete its work at COP18, the final 
decision stresses the importance of its continuation and requests the SBI to elaborate 
activities to further the understanding of and expertise on loss and damage. In 
elaborating these activities, the SBI is asked to take into account further work needs 
regarding, inter alia, the risk of slow onset events and approaches to address them, non-
economic losses and damages and how to identify and develop appropriate approaches 
to cope with loss and damages.43    
The COP decision further requests the UNFCCC secretariat to carry out three interim 
activities under the work programme on loss and damage prior to SBI 39: an expert 
meeting to consider future needs associated with possible approaches to address slow 
onset events, a technical paper on non-economic losses and a technical paper on gaps in 
existing institutional arrangements within and outside the UNFCCC. SBI is asked to 
consider the latter technical paper when developing the functions and modalities of the 
institutional arrangements.44 
With the inclusion of loss and damage in the Doha Climate Gateway, developing 
countries achieved historic recognition of the drastic consequences they are already 
experiencing due to climate change. However, key questions regarding the institutional 
arrangements and the potential establishment of a mechanism remain unanswered and 
                                                
42 Draft decision -/CP.18 Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate  change 
impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change 
to enhance adaptive capacity (Revised proposal by the President), FCCC/CP/2012/L.4/Rev.1, 8 
December 2012, para 9. 
43 Draft decision -/CP.18 Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate  change 
impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change 
to enhance adaptive capacity (Revised proposal by the President), FCCC/CP/2012/L.4/Rev.1, 8 
December 2012, para 12 and 7. 
44 Draft decision -/CP.18 Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate  change 
impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change 
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will have to be discussed together with open questions on the sources of funds and how 
they would be disbursed.  
6.3 Finance 
Since the beginning of the climate change negotiations, one of the fundamental 
challenges has been the issue of financing efforts of developing countries to combat  
climate change and to adapt to its adverse effects. Developing countries have 
continuously called for an increase of multilateral climate finance under the UNFCCC 
as a core responsibility of developed countries – as the latter have indeed committed to 
in Art. 4 of the Convention. Industrialised countries, on the other hand, have been rather 
reluctant to significantly ramp up their finance commitments to the various financing 
institutions under the UNFCCC. As a consequence, pledges to the funds under the 
UNFCCC (Special Climate Change Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund, and 
Adaptation Fund) and to the GEF have been notoriously low. 
A major step towards the needed increase in finance flows to combat climate change 
was made in Copenhagen in 2009, where industrialised countries pledged to commit 30 
billion USD of “fast-start finance” over three years until the end of 2012, and to 
mobilise up 100 billion USD from “various sources” for adaptation and mitigation 
purposes from 2020. The Copenhagen Accord also includes the establishment of the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF), although at that time there was no mention of its 
institutional structure. In the following year in Cancún, the task to design the structure 
of the fund over the course of 2011 was delegated to a Transitional Committee. Also, 
Cancún saw the establishment of the Standing Committee as an oversight body to the 
Convention's financial mechanism, whose function and role was further defined in 
Durban the following year. 
Apart from negotiations on the Standing Committee at COP 17 in Durban, the main 
discussions on finance revolved around the operationalisation of the Green Climate 
Fund. A compromise in the Transitional Committee on the draft design document just 
prior to the conference had been opposed in the last minute by the USA and Saudi 
Arabia. It was feared that the document would be re-opened in the COP, and the 
compromise lost. After intense negotiations throughout the conference, the design 
document was adopted unchanged. A supplementary COP decision addressed some of 
the concerns that had been tabled, including a procedure to select the trustee of the fund, 
and one to ensure that funding by the GCF's private sector facility would not contravene 
national climate strategies and plans. However, no decision could be reached on the host 
country of the Fund. Selecting the host country was therefore set as one of the primary 
concerns of the newly-formed GCF Board. A number of countries contributed funding 
for the start-up costs of the Fund, but no pledges were made to the Fund itself. 
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Just prior to COP 18 in Doha this year, the GCF Board chose Songdo in the Republic of 
Korea to host the Green Climate Fund.45 COP 18 endorsed the decision, and requested 
the GCF Board and the Republic of Korea to conclude the legal and administrative 
arrangements for hosting the GCF. The GCF Board was further requested to report to 
COP 19 on the implementation of the Fund, including, among others, a balanced 
allocation between adaptation and mitigation activities, and secure funding. Any interim 
arrangements should terminate no later than COP 19.46 A number of countries have 
pledged contributions to the administrative budget of the GCF, but so far still no 
financial commitments for the actual activities of the GCF have surfaced. 
Another issue that as yet has not been resolved is the relationship between the Green 
Climate Fund and the COP. The GCF Board had discussed the matter at its first and 
second meetings, but had not come to a conclusion.47 A number of developing 
countries, among them the African Group, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Saudi 
Arabia, India, China, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Maldives and Venezuela, had submitted 
proposals on arrangements between the GCF and the COP to the effect that the GCF 
should be fully accountable to and receive guidance from the COP, and giving the COP 
greater oversight over the GCF.48 Contrary to the decision taken in Durban, the 
arrangements between the two bodies were not to be drafted by the GCF itself, but to be 
delegated to the Standing Committee as an independent body. This proposal was 
supported by Saudi Arabia, Zambia and the LDCs, while USA and Japan opposed it. 
AOSIS and the EU proposed to draft the arrangements cooperatively between the COP 
and the GCF Board. In the end, the COP decided that the GCF Board and the Standing 
Committee should develop arrangements between COP and GCF, which are to be 
approved at COP 19.49 
The Standing Committee, after its further operationalisation in Durban, held its first two 
meetings in Bangkok and Cape Town in 2012. Its members and officers were 
nominated, and a work programme for 2013-2015 developed.50 The work programme 
includes, among others, organising a forum for communication and continued exchange 
of information among bodies and entities dealing with climate change finance in order 
to promote linkages and coherence; provision of draft guidance for the operating entities 
of the financial mechanism to the COP; recommendations to the COP on how to 
improve the coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of the operating entities of the 
financial mechanism; provision of expert input into the preparation and conduct of the 
                                                
45Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2012/5, 20 November 
2012.  
46 Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate 
Fund: Proposal by the President, FCCC/CP/2012/L.17, 8 December 2012. 
47 Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2012/5, 20 November 
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49 Arrangements between the Conference of the Parties and the Green Climate Fund: Proposal by the 
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50 Report of the Standing Committee to the Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2012/4, 24 October 2012. 
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periodic reviews of the financial mechanism by the COP; and the advancement of the 
Standing Committee's functions.  
This year's COP in Doha welcomed the Standing Committee's report on its first 
meetings, and, inter alia, endorsed the work programme; renamed the committee to the 
Standing Committee on Finance; and requested it to consider ways of strengthening 
methodologies for reporting climate finance in its first biennial assessment and 
overview of financial flows.51 
The Standing Committee has also been tasked to further amend the guidelines for the 
review of the financial mechanism, and to present an updated version at COP 19 the 
following year. The COP has initiated the fifth review of the financial mechanism, and, 
after possibly adopting the revised guidelines next year, to finalise the review by COP 
20. Parties are invited to submit their views on the review by 1 March 2013.52  
Many discussions in this year's COP revolved around the work programme on long-
term finance that had been decided in Durban. This work programme is to answer the 
question of how to scale up climate finance to the USD 100 billion annually from 2020 
promised in Copenhagen and Cancún. Under the work programme, two workshops and 
two webinars were held in 2012, which attracted a lot of attention. Outcomes of the 
work programme for 2012 included the recognition of a need for scaling-up, 
mobilisation and catalysing climate finance and investments; a need for a political 
process with a focus on sources and options for mobilising climate finance in the short, 
medium and long terms; clarification of how developed countries will deliver on their 
commitment to jointly mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020; needs for enhanced 
information on climate-related financing needs by developing countries, and 
strengthening of ways to track climate finance; and the need for enhancing enabling 
environments. It was also recommended that a regular climate finance forum and 
market place be established, "bringing together all relevant actors - public and private 
sector and other stakeholders - to build an effective response and rapidly increase the 
deployment of finance for mitigation and climate resilient development."53  
When discussing the report, Parties once more disagreed on the inclusion of revenues 
from international aviation and shipping as a possible source of finance. Japan called 
the consideration of this under the UNFCCC inappropriate, and Saudi Arabia feared 
negative impacts on developing countries as an effect of international taxation. The 
decision of the COP takes note of the report on the work programme, and decides to 
extend it for another year, "with the aim of informing developed country Parties in their 
efforts to identify pathways for mobilizing the scaling up of climate finance to USD 100 
billion per year by 2020 from public, private and alternative sources in the context of 
                                                
51 Report of the Standing Committee: Proposal by the President, FCCC/CP/2012/L.16, 8 December 2012. 
52 Review of the financial mechanism: Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair, FCCC/SBI/2012/L.45, 1 
December 2012. 
53 Report on the workshops of the work programme on longterm finance: Note by the chairs, 
FCCC/CP/2012/3, 6 November 2012. 
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meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation". Existing processes 
within the UNFCCC for assessing and reviewing developing countries' needs for 
finance are to be continued.54  
As the period of Fast Start Finance ends this year, and there is no agreed pathway to 
ramp up climate finance to the commitment of 100 billion USD by 2020, discussions on 
this mid-term "finance gap" between 2013 and 2020 cropped up in many fora of the 
negotiations in Doha this year. Developing countries called for a clear mid-term goal 
that would ensure an increase of financing levels, and a clear path to the 100-billion 
goal. However, there is only very little substance on finance commitments of developed 
countries in the final adopted agreements. The outcome of the AWG-LCA 
acknowledges developed countries' delivery of Fast Start Finance, and merely invites 
them to expedite its full disbursement. It also invites developed countries to submit 
information on their strategies and approaches for mobilising scaled-up climate finance 
by the next COP, and encourages them to "further increase their efforts to provide 
resources of at least to the average annual level of the fast-start finance period for 2013-
2015".55 The decision also calls for a high-level ministerial dialogue for the 
consideration of progress on long-term finance at the coming COP.  
In their closing statements both to the AWG-LCA and the COP, many developing 
country delegates lamented the lack of ambition on finance by industrialised countries, 
calling the decisions an "empty shell" (Philippines), and only promising that "something 
might materialise in the future" (Nauru). It remains to be seen if the work programme 
on long-term finance and the soon-to-be fully operational Green Climate Fund will coax 
developed countries into more action on the finance front, but experience from the last 
years makes this hope very bleak. 
6.4 Technology 
Technology development and transfer, one of the key building blocks of 2007's Bali 
Action Plan, resumed its slow progress in Doha this year. In a brief surge of activity on 
the issue in Cancún, Parties had agreed to establish a Technology Mechanism, 
comprising a Technology Executive Committee (TEC), and a Climate Technology 
Centre and Network (CTCN). In Durban, the TEC's initial modalities and rules as well 
as its rules of procedure had been agreed without much disagreement. The CTCN, 
however, had been more difficult. While Parties had finally been able to agree on the 
CTCN's terms of reference, there had been no agreement on who was to host it. 
Therefore the institution was in fact non-existent.  
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Neither had an agreement been reached on the future relation between the TEC and the 
CTCN in Durban. Especially developing countries had envisaged the TEC as a sort of 
oversight body with political power, while industrialised countries saw it as a body of 
specialists without an oversight function to the CTCN. The final decision does not 
contain a governing role for the TEC, but establishes an advisory board to the CTCN as 
monitoring body. 
Over the course of 2012, the TEC held two meetings including workshops, which, 
among others, resulted in key messages on: technology needs assessments (TNAs); 
enabling environments for and barriers to technology development and transfer; and 
technology roadmaps. Among the key messages are:  
• TNAs and their syntheses are a key information source for the work of the TEC on 
the prioritization of activities under the Technology Mechanism, and could be a rich 
source of information for governments, business and other stakeholders; 
• The Technology Mechanism and other international instruments used to promote 
technology transfer to developing countries should be clearly aligned with the 
enabling frameworks that facilitate private- and public-sector investment; 
• Technology road maps can complement efforts and actions undertaken by various 
stakeholders at the international and the national levels, including TNAs, NAMAs 
and NAPs, and help to build the confidence of stakeholders who need to be engaged 
from an early stage.56 
All key messages are contained in the TEC's report to the Subsidiary Bodies of the 
Convention.57 SBSTA and COP welcomed the report, and encouraged Parties to use 
experiences gained from the TEC's workshop on technology needs assessments in the 
preparation of NAMAs, NAPs, LEDS or technology roadmaps. The COP further agreed 
that the TNA process should be integrated with other processes under the Convention 
dealing with NAMAs, NAPs and LEDS, and stressed the need for the implementation 
of the TNA results.58 The Committee will undertake further activities on enabling 
environments as part of its workplan for 2013. 
The TEC had also formed an anonymous evaluation panel for the selection of the host 
of the CTCN. During the first week of the negotiations in Doha, it was announced that 
UNEP as a leader of a consortium was chosen to host the CTCN, and the COP agreed to 
"Arrangements to make the Climate Technology Centre and Network fully operational". 
The agreement includes a Memorandum of Understanding between the COP and UNEP 
outlining their respective responsibilities and initial steps in the operationalisation of the 
                                                
56 Report on activities and performance of the Technology Executive Committee for 2012, 
FCCC/SB/2012/2, 18 October 2012, paras 30, 35, 42. 
57 ibid. 
58 Development and transfer of technologies and implementation of the Technology Mechanism. Proposal 
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CTCN.59 Parties are invited to nominate national designated entities for technology 
transfer, which will become part of the nascent Network. The decision also establishes 
the Advisory Board as agreed to in Durban. The Board will have to lay down its 
modalities and rules of procedure in its first session in 2013, and present them to the 
Subsidiary Bodies in 2013.  
So the institutional arrangements continued their slow, but steady progress in Doha. 
Anyhow, Parties were unable to reach agreement on some crucial institutional matters. 
The relationship between the TEC and the CTCN were once more discussed, with 
developing countries requesting a stronger role for the TEC in the context of the 
Technology Mechanism. Unable to reach a consensus, Parties delayed the discussion to 
the next COP.  
Also, the relationship between the Technology Mechanism and the financial mechanism 
of the Convention proved to be unsolvable. Many developing countries have long 
clamoured for possibilities of direct access to finance for technology support, which 
would mean a much stronger stance for technology support in the UNFCCC context. 
Equally, many developed countries refuse that the Technology Mechanism should be 
able to access funding directly via a technology window in the financial mechanism. 
Anyhow, the Technology Mechanism will remain very weak without reliable and clear 
financial backing. The COP decided to take up the matter again in two years' time, at 
COP 20.60  
Another matter that gives rise to continuous discussions among Parties is the role of 
intellectual property rights in the context of technology transfer under the Convention. 
While an earlier version of the negotiating text under the AWG-LCA explicitly 
mentioned mechanisms to promote access to affordable environmentally sound 
technologies, the final agreed text only gives reference to the TEC report which 
recommends further analysis of the role of IPRs in the technology transfer process.61 
While many developing countries support the TEC to further work on IPRs, some 
developed countries insist that the issue should not be dealt with in the UNFCCC 
context. It is still unclear if this discussion will ever be dealt with satisfactorily for all - 
or at least most - Parties. 
7. Assessment and Outlook 
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Many have highlighted that Doha succeeded in streamlining the negotiation process. 
Since 2005, the future of the climate regime had been negotiated in two tracks, the 
groups on the Kyoto Protocol and on long-term cooperative action under the 
Convention. After the failure to produce an agreed outcome in Copenhagen, Durban 
established yet another group, the ADP, to negotiate a comprehensive climate 
agreement by 2015. Doha closed the AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA so that countries 
can now focus their full attention on the ADP. 
From the beginning, Doha was billed as a “transitional” COP, and nevertheless for a 
while it seemed close to collapse. The conference was ultimately saved through the 
COP president’s vigorous wielding of his gavel, but once again saving the process came 
at the expense of actually achieving substantive results.  
7.1 Key Outcomes 
7.1.1 Business as Usual in the Second Kyoto Period 
The value of the Kyoto Protocol lies not only in the quantified emission reduction 
commitments. It also lies in the common rules for emissions accounting and the global 
carbon market it has established. With the agreement on the second commitment period 
these features will be strongly in play to be included in the new comprehensive 
agreement that is being negotiated under the ADP. 
However, today’s Kyoto Protocol is clearly only a shadow of its former self. In Kyoto, 
all industrialised countries, covering more than half of global emissions, committed to 
reducing their emissions. After the defection of the USA, Japan, Canada, New Zealand 
and Russian Federation, CP 2 covers merely about 15% of global GHG emissions. 
In addition, the commitments that have been made are by far too weak to actually 
achieve the target of keeping global temperature increase below 2°C. While the IPCC 
suggested that Annex I countries should reduce their emissions by at least 25-40% 
below 1990 levels by 2020, current commitments at best add up to 18%, not counting 
loopholes. Most of the commitments are hardly better than business as usual. For 
instance, the EU, which likes to portray itself as frontrunner, has committed to reducing 
its emissions by 20% by 2020 while domestic emissions in 2011 were already at -
17.6%. Taking into account the credits from the flexible Kyoto mechanisms that were 
surrendered in the EU emission trading system in 2011, the EU has already reduced 
emissions by 20.7%.62 
As a concession to developing countries the decision includes a review mechanism to 
increase ambition, which allows increasing the commitments through amendment 
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without the need for ratification. In addition, Parties are obliged to consider 
strengthening the commitments in 2014 and the review process will include a 
ministerial meeting to ensure high-level attention to the issue. However, several 
industrialised countries noted that in their view the ADP process on short-term ambition 
was the one where the real music was playing, essentially calling the KP review a 
bothersome formality. 
In addition, the first Kyoto Period will probably accumulate about 13 billion surplus 
emission units and Doha decided that these may be fully carried over to CP2. This 
surplus has mostly not been accumulated through successful emission reduction policies 
but because the Kyoto targets of the former Eastern bloc countries were set well above 
their projected business-as-usual emission levels. At least Doha did manage to put in 
place some restrictions on using these surplus units in CP2: They may only be used for 
complying with the CP2 targets if emissions in a country go above the target and buyers 
may only purchase these units up to a maximum of 2% of their CP1 targets. In addition, 
all potential buyers submitted political declarations saying that they were not going to 
buy CP1 surplus units. 
However, given the weak targets there would anyway not have been strong demand for 
hot air allowances anyway. The real problem is that the countries with surpluses will 
certainly want to carry them over into the post-2020 agreement. The hot air issue is 
therefore far from “resolved”, as for example EU climate commissioner Hedegaard has 
claimed.63 
One of the few positive results was that at least there will be no new “hot air” during 
CP2. Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine had again submitted targets well above their 
current and projected emission levels. For example, in the Ukraine emissions are 
currently about 60% below 1990 levels while the target it has submitted is only 20%. 
However, Doha decided that all CP2 units above the average level of emissions in 
2008-10 will automatically be cancelled. 
7.1.2 Money’s Too Tight to Mention in the AWG-LCA 
After having started with great applause and hopes for a new climate policy future in 
2007, the AWG-LCA closed down amid strong acrimony and disappointment. 
Industrialised countries were eager to terminate the LCA and move on to the in their 
view real work of negotiating the 2015 agreement, arguing that the mandate of the 
AWG-LCA had essentially been completed in Cancún and Durban. They had hardly 
any give in them regarding climate finance and other issues and many feared that no 
agreement at all would be possible, which would have left many of the developing 
countries’ key issues without a satisfactory resolution. These fears were not assuaged 
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when the LCA chair produced a compilation text on 3 December that had blank pages 
on adaptation, finance, technology and capacity building and other issues. 
The adoption of the Bali Action Plan was clearly a landmark event, with one emerging 
economy country after the other declaring that they were willing to contribute their fair 
shares and the USA getting told to lead or get out of the way. And on the positive side, 
the AWG-LCA has resulted in more than 80 Annex I and non-Annex I countries 
making emission reduction pledges as well as a bevy of new institutions: the Green 
Climate Fund, the Standing Committee on Finance, the Technology Executive 
Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), the Adaptation 
Committee and the Adaptation Framework. 
However, many of the emission reduction pledges are unclear, have conditionalities 
attached and cover wide ranges of possible reductions. The UNEP emissions gap report 
has no less than four scenarios on how the pledges may play out, ranging from 52 to 57 
Gt CO2-eq. of emissions in 2020. And even the best-case scenario is a full 8 Gt CO2-eq. 
above where emissions should be as a maximum in 2020 to maintain a reasonable 
chance to achieve the 2°C target. UNEP also warned that the gap has actually increased 
by 2 Gt CO2-eq. compared to last year’s report, rather than decreased.64 
In addition, the Bali Action Plan clearly highlighted the “comparability of efforts” of 
industrialised countries as a key objective. However, in addition to the wide numerical 
disparity of the pledges not even technical comparability is within reach. As in the past, 
the US strongly resisted all efforts to bring the emission accounting rules under the 
Convention in line with those under the Kyoto Protocol. Ultimately, Doha only 
managed to agree on a further work programme to inter alia identify “common 
elements” for measuring progress made toward the achievement of targets. 
And while there is a host of new institutions, they remain to be endowed with actual 
meaning, that is, the resources to actually do some work. There continues to be no 
clarity on how financial support for developing countries will be scaled up to the USD 
100 billion that were promised in Copenhagen and Cancún. Developing countries had 
demanded a clear roadmap with mid-term targets, but with the exception of some 
European countries most industrialised countries refused to clarify how much finance 
they were going to provide over the next years. In the end developing countries 
therefore only got a vague promise that industrialised countries will try to provide as 
least as much as during the last years, which was roughly USD 10 billion annually. At 
least, the invitation to industrialised countries to present their strategies for a mid-term 
financing goal will keep the needed scaling-up of finance on the political agenda. 
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At the same time, OECD figures show that industrialised countries spent USD 58 
billion on fossil fuel subsidies in 2011 – 5-6 times as much as they spent on climate 
finance. And this despite agreeing at the G20 summit in 2009 that phasing out fossil 
fuel subsidies should be a priority.65 
One of the few silver linings from the perspective of developing countries was the 
question of loss and damage associated with climate change impacts that cannot be 
addressed through adaptation measures, such as extreme weather events or sea level 
rise. Despite resistance from industrialised countries and in particular the USA who fear 
being confronted with open-ended liability claims, Parties laid the foundation for 
institutional arrangements, such as an international mechanism, which, once established, 
could channel funds to developing countries suffering from the consequences of climate 
change. While this decision represents a pivotal step forward, here as well key questions 
including the sources of funding and how funds will be disbursed remain unanswered 
and will have to be further discussed next year. And the final text, "Decides to establish, 
at its nineteenth session, institutional arrangements, such as an international 
mechanism..." allows both sides to claim they got things their own way. While 
developing countries may claim that they got the option of establishing an international 
mechanism, the USA may equally claim that they did not agree to establish any such 
mechanism. 
7.1.3 The Durban Platform: To Firewall or Not to Firewall? 
The Durban conference last year decided that a new comprehensive climate agreement 
is to be negotiated by 2015 and start being implemented in 2020. In addition, a second 
work stream under the so-called “Durban Platform” is to negotiate ways for scaling up 
mitigation ambition for the period up to 2020. The task of the ADP for Doha was 
modest enough, it was merely to agree on the work programme for the next years, and 
in the end it turned out much less specific than many had hoped. Instead of a series of 
workshops with clear thematic focus as proposed for example by the small island states, 
the content of the next sessions was largely left open and will be left to the chairs of the 
working groups to be determined. As it is, what was agreed is more a schedule of events 
rather than a work programme. 
The major controversy was about whether to make a reference to the Convention’s 
principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities in the work stream 
on the future agreement. As in Durban, the USA was adamantly opposed to any 
mention of these principles, due to concern that they may be invoked to uphold the 
“firewall” between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. As in Durban, the final decision 
does not mention these principles and even a reference to the outcome of the Rio+20 
conference which did endorse them was deleted at the insistence of the USA. What is 
left is language that the ADP’s work will be guided by the principles of the Convention, 
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and in the final plenary the USA noted that they viewed this provision as having no 
relation to mandate and would reject any attempt to invoke it in the further work of the 
ADP. 
Nevertheless, the ADP work programme does include “application of the principles of 
the Convention” as a discussion item, so there is a hook to discuss how to equitably 
share the necessary effort in the 2015 agreement. A beginning is the time for taking the 
most delicate care that the balances are correct. 
7.2 Negotiation Dynamics 
7.2.1 A Frontrunner Tripping Over Its Own Feet 
The EU deserves a fair share of the blame for the weak Doha outcome. Intransigence by 
the USA and others can be taken for granted, so more progressive players need to figure 
out how to overcome this resistance beforehand. The success of a climate conference 
hinges on whether those who actually care about combating climate change are able to 
form coalitions and push those who do not against the wall. Just one year ago in Durban 
the EU provided a demonstration of how this can be done, coming with clear asks and 
clear offers, on the basis of which it was able to form an alliance with the small island 
states, least developed countries and others and thus isolate the naysayers.66  
In Doha, the EU came bearing an emission reduction target it basically has already 
achieved, no joint financial commitment, and due to its internal differences on the issue 
it did not have any position on how to deal with the surplus units from the first Kyoto 
period until the pre-final night of the conference. All of these issues were key asks of 
developing countries, and thus the EU once again managed to turn itself into the bad 
guy, even though on substance it nevertheless had relatively speaking much more on 
offer than most other industrialised countries. 
The EU therefore urgently needs to get in some low-carbon exercise in the run-up to the 
2015 conference, which France wishes to host in Paris. One may probably be forgiven if 
the prospect of having the final round of negotiations on a new climate agreement going 
down in an EU capital gives one a strange feeling of déjà vu.67 And sticking to 20% is 
probably the best recipe the EU could possibly come up with to make 100% sure that 
Paris is going to be another Copenhagen. 
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A key factor is that the enlarged EU with its 27 and now 28 member states is no longer 
the essentially Western European EU that took the lead on the Berlin Mandate and 
rescuing the Kyoto Protocol after the US defection. The new member states are much 
less wealthy than the old ones and to a certain extent it is understandable why countries 
such as Poland, which derives more than 90% of its electricity from coal, have 
difficulties with committing to aggressive mitigation actions. To be able to regain its 
former international stature, the EU will therefore probably need to work out a long-
term internal effort sharing arrangement as the basis for presenting a united front 
internationally. As part of this, the economic powerhouses of Western Europe will 
probably need to offer the new members states substantial and reliable support for 
transitioning to a clean energy future. 
7.2.2 An Unmovable Hegemon? 
Post-election comments by President Obama had raised some hopes that the USA might 
take a more constructive position in the climate negotiations. In Doha, however, the 
USA was once again less than helpful in moving the process forward. Throughout the 
meeting, they rejected any suggestion to raise their emission reduction pledge and also 
refused to give developing countries any reassurance on the scale-up of climate finance. 
The USA also did its best to block the discussion on loss and damage, in particular the 
idea of establishing an international mechanism. 
One positive moment was when Todd Stern, the lead US negotiator, declared that the 
USA was very interested in discussing equity and effort sharing for the post-2020 
agreement. Nevertheless, the USA again tried to block any reference to the principles of 
the Convention in the ADP decision. 
Post-Doha news are again raising hopes that a major change in US policy may be afoot. 
Apparently Senator John Kerry is slated to succeed Hillary Clinton as Secretary of 
State. Kerry has in the past been a strong supporter of tackling climate change and 
observers expect that he would make the issue a top priority in the State Department.68 
In addition, President Obama told “Time” magazine that climate change and energy 
were going to be among his priorities for his second presidency, “My primary focus is 
going to continue to be on the economy, on immigration, on climate change and 
energy”.69 
However, any meaningful action will require the cooperation of Congress. In particular, 
ratification of international treaties requires a 2/3 majority in the Senate. And the house 
that is the United States of America is perhaps more divided against itself than it has 
ever been in one and a half centuries. The rest of the world may therefore wish to 
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consider how to deal with a country where one of the two major Parties has apparently 
almost completely withdrawn into its own version of reality, dismissing facts and 
evidence that do not fit with their view of the world – not only on climate change but on 
any number of issues. Apparently this has gone as far as going into the recent election 
confidently that Romney would win whereas most polls had shown a lead for Obama.70 
The exasperation about the current state of the Republican Party is not only shared by 
US liberals but also by a number of conservatives, who have called the GOP a “cult”71 
and “the problem”: 
"The GOP has become an insurgent outlier in American politics. It is 
ideologically extreme; scornful of compromise; unmoved by conventional 
understanding of facts, evidence and science; and dismissive of the legitimacy of 
its political opposition. 
When one party moves this far from the mainstream, it makes it nearly 
impossible for the political system to deal constructively with the country’s 
challenges."72 
One may also note that climate was also named as one of the top priorities of the new 
Obama administration in 2009.73 And that observers have assigned a large share of the 
blame for the failure of the climate bill to the White House.74 
Given this domestic US situation and given that international treaties need a 2/3 
majority in the US Senate, expecting that the US will be able to agree to any kind of 
ambitious climate agreement in 2015 would seem to put the climate process on track for 
another Copenhagen. Or a repetition of the Kyoto experience, where the Protocol was 
largely designed according to US preferences, only to have the US not ratify it 
regardless. If wishes were fishes, we'd all cast nets.  
7.2.3 Developing Countries Taking Different Tacks 
The former unity of the G-77 and China is increasingly dissolving. In recent years, 
AOSIS and the LDCs repeatedly clashed with the larger G-77 countries, in particular 
China and India, on what should be the way forward, most dramatically in the final 
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plenary in Durban. Brazil, China, India and South Africa have in recent years developed 
a distinct identity in the BASIC block. The left-wing Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Peoples of our America (ALBA in Spanish) that consists of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela continually exhorts industrialised countries to pay their 
“climate debt” and undertake radical emission reductions. 
2012 saw the emergence of two new groups. On the one hand, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Panama and Peru, formed AILAC, the Association of Independent 
Latin American and Caribbean states. According to one of their interventions, AILAC is 
“formed around the view that countries need to act according to their capabilities and 
stop looking to others to act first.” 
On the other hand, the also newly active75 “group of like-minded developing countries”, 
which consists of China and India, several Arabic and left-leaning Latin American 
countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela, and further middle-income 
countries such as the Philippines and Pakistan, is focusing on upholding the UNFCCC’s 
principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and reminding 
industrialised countries’ of their historical responsibility for creating the climate 
problem. 
7.2.4 Creating a Positive Feedback Loop Between National and 
International Action 
“Survival is the ability to swim in strange water.” 
Many will probably once again blame the UN process for the weak outcome and 
suggest that climate change should be dealt with in other fora. However, the problem is 
not the process. The G20 and other fora have been dealing with climate change for 
years, and with the same lack of results. 
The fundamental issue is that international politics do not happen in a vacuum. The 
positions countries take internationally are determined by their domestic political 
situations. International negotiations can therefore rarely take decisions that have not 
previously been prepared nationally. 
And the current situation is that in most key countries there is as yet no appetite to 
undergo the fundamental economic and ecologic transformation that is necessary. 
Energy provision and transport are dominated by strong incumbent industries whose 
business models rely on using fossil fuels, and combating climate change basically 
requires to end these business models. The vast majority of the Earth’s fossil fuel 
reserves needs to be left underground, two thirds of them according to the latest World 
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Energy Outlook76 from the International Energy Agency, or even four fifths when 
taking as basis a global carbon budget that gives a 80% rather than only a 50% chance 
of actually staying below 2°C.77 Incidentally, countries’ positions on climate change 
align rather neatly with the amounts of fossil fuel reserves they have on their 
territories.78 
Given these domestic constraints, “At the end of the day, ministers were left with two 
unpalatable choices: accept an abysmally weak deal, or see the talks collapse in 
acrimony and despair – with no clear path forward”, as Alden Meyer from the Union of 
Concerned Scientists put it.79 
Progress in the international climate negotiations will therefore only be possible if 
sufficiently large pro-climate advocacy coalitions can be brought together in the key 
countries and across borders. And while it is certainly not able to the save climate on its 
own, the international climate process can serve as a key catalyst for the national 
discussions. While Copenhagen did not produce the hoped-for treaty, the deadline 
imposed by the Copenhagen conference injected a significant momentum into national 
discussions. One country after another elaborated domestic targets and actions, and 
presented them to the international audience. The run-up to Copenhagen hence resulted 
in a much better understanding of national mitigation potentials, available policy 
options and actions that countries are prepared to take. This momentum would hardly 
have materialised without the positive pressure exerted by the Copenhagen deadline. 
And in keeping this momentum, emission reduction actions are getting implemented in 
many countries around the globe, even if far from the scale that is needed.80 
One of the main reasons why progress is so slow is that many people are not convinced 
that it is actually possible to sharply reduce emissions without wrecking the economy. 
Industrialised countries fear that taking the lead will lead to deindustrialisation and 
developing countries see being able to emit CO2 without constraint as much-needed 
“development space”. While the EU has tried to stop talking about “burden sharing” 
and instead talk about “effort sharing”, “burden sharing” is what everyone has on their 
minds, which becomes clear from statements from Northern and Southern leaders: 
“We will not cut our development potential.” 
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(Our) “lifestyle is not up for negotiation.” 
(It) “would cost us jobs and damage our industry.” 
(It) “would have a negative impact on the living standards (. . .) and for the 
competitiveness and for our businesses.” 
“A more ambitious target would constrict (our) development space.”81 
Yvo de Boer, the former head of the UNFCC secretariat, identified this lack of 
confidence in the viability of low-emission development as the key factor behind the 
failure of Copenhagen to deliver the hoped-for agreement.82 
Pioneers showing that it is possible are hence critical. This could help creating a 
virtuous cycle where the international process serves to keep the climate issue on the 
agenda and at the same time catalyses bottom-up processes, which then in turn inject 
further momentum into the international process. Ambitious action by frontrunners also 
induces technological learning, which makes it easier for others to follow. For example, 
the renewables feed-in tariffs in Germany and other countries have induced massive 
cost reductions. The most striking case is solar PV where for each doubling of globally 
installed capacity the costs have dropped by 22%. And these trends are set to continue 
so that according to some analysts solar PV may even become cheaper than coal within 
this very decade – even without a carbon price.83 
The run-up to 2015 must hence be seized as a catalyst to build national momentum. The 
opportunities will certainly be there, for instance the next assessment report by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change. And one of the few silver linings from 
Doha was the announcement by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon that he would 
convene a world leaders’ summit on climate change in 2014. Such a summit is exactly 
what some analysts have called for: 
“The decisions required in 2015 will be momentous... These decisions are not 
within the powers of environment ministers, and they will not happen of their 
own accord. They require the direct engagement of heads of government, under 
the full glare of a summit spotlight. And that summit requires the kind of 
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pressure that only the coordinated mobilization of global civil society — 
including the scientific community, businesses, non-governmental organizations 
and youth movements — can achieve.”84 
And the pressure that needs to be put on governments to get them moving seems to be 
enormous, given how little difference events like hurricane Sandy and the increasingly 
stark warnings even from normally staid institutions like the IEA and the World Bank 
have so far made. The below quote from a speech Churchill gave in Parliament in 1936 
sounds as if it had been written for today’s situation: 
“So they [the Government] go on in strange paradox, decided only to be 
undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-
powerful to be impotent…. Owing to past neglect, in the face of the plainest 
warnings, we have entered upon a period of danger….  The era of 
procrastination, of half measures, of soothing and baffling expedience of delays, 
is coming to its close.  In its place we are entering a period of consequences….  
We cannot avoid this period, we are in it now….”85 
It seems as if it’s up to each one individually to take up Churchill’s mantle and start 
pushing their governments for action, given that there’s no politician in sight who 
would fit the bill. What is the world coming to when even 100 billion dollar hedge fund 
managers are calling on people to be brave and “Be persuasive. Be brave. Be arrested (if 
necessary)”?86 
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